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REAPPORTIONMENT: REVISIONISM OR
REVOLUTION?
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER*
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction
if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take juris-
diction, if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature
may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of
the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful.
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may
be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us.
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Ques-
tions may occur, which we would gladly avoid; but we can-
not avoid them.1
I. "ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE"
In the space of twenty-six months-from March 26, 1962, to
June 15, 1964-a series of nine epochal rulings by the Supreme
Court of the United States has fundamentally altered the rationale
of representative government in this country. The manifiest cumula-
tive result of the complementary opinions is as follows: The initial
Tennessee case2 by a six-to-two majority held that an irrational
basis for apportionment of representation in the lower house of a
state legislature violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Two Georgia cases3 then overturned state election laws
that gave unequal weight to voting in various parts of the state in
statewide elections, whether for state officers, United States Sena-
tors, or United States Representatives. The wheel then came full
circle in a series of cases covering upperhouse state legislative repre-
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary.
'Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 404 (1821). (Emphasis added.)
'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963).
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sentation in Alabama,4 Colorado,5 Delaware,' Maryland,7 New
York,8 and Virginia;9 for, declared the Court, "in a society osten-
sibly grounded on representative government, it would seem reason-
able that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority
of that State's legislators,"' 0 and electoral districts cannot give pri-
mary consideration to trees and land over flesh and blood."
Seldom in American constitutional history-if ever-has the
Court had occasion to touch upon virtually all dimensions of a
fundamental issue so promptly and so completely. While recogniz-
ing that "a federal court cannot 'pronounce any statute, either of
a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with
the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal
rights of litigants in actual controversies,' "'" the Court in Baker
v. Carr" virtually invited the raising of such issues, not only by
vigorously reasserting jurisdiction of the subject matter but in the
process indicating that the danger that assumption and exercise of
jurisdiction "may bring our function into clash with the political
departments of Government"' 4 would not be a serious deterrent.
The Court thus not only rejected the Frankfurter thesis of "judicial
restraint"-applied in the 1946 case of Colegrove v. Green'8 to a
mounting apportionment agitation-but made reasonably clear, by
'Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
'Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
7Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656(1964).
'WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
'Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
" Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
11 "Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. . . . Again,
people, not land or trees or pastures, vote." Id. at 580.
"' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (citing Liverpool, N.Y. &
Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1884)).18369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
"328 U.S. 549 (1946). See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the
four-to-three majority, holding that a question of malapportionment under
the Illinois election laws was not justiciable because "due regard for the
effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly
political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination." Id. at
552. It is worth noting that Frankfurter dissented in Baker, and subse-
quently retired from the bench; his three concurring colleagues in Colegrove
-Justices Burton, Reed and Rutledge-have all left the Court, as has Mr.
Justice Murphy, who joined with Justices Black and Douglas in the dissent,
At the time of this opinion, June 10, 1946, Mr. Chief Justice Stone had
died, and Mr. Justice Jackson was absent on service with the War Crimes
Commission.
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its criticism of the thesis in pertinent cases,1" that the future rulings
would definitely lead in new directions.
The Baker case itself, in the opinion of the majority read by
Mr. Justice Brennan, went on to indicate the new directions of
constitutional jurisprudence on the subject. "A citizen's right to
vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action '" was shown to
have been established in earlier cases involving erroneous tallies,' s
failure to count votes,'9 and ballot-box stuffing.2" Gerrymandering,
particularly with a racial motivation, had been added to the instances
of justiciability in this subject area, 2' and Baker readily analogized
from the finding in that case: "When a State exercises power wholly
within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal
judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state
power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally pro-
tected right.1
22
That federally protected right, identified in such case by the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, was-as the
Court made clearer a year later-a broad one in the matter of
electoral privileges. In Gray v. Sanders,2 s speaking for a majority
of eight to one, Mr. Justice Douglas observed:
If a State in a statewide election weighted the male vote more
heavily than the female vote or the white vote more heavily than
the Negro vote, none could successfully contend that that dis-
crimination was allowable. . . . How then can one person be
given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in
a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or
because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once a geographi-
cal unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated,
" See the cases cited in 369 U.S. at 202-03, and see 369 U.S. at 205-07
nn.24-28. The Frankfurter thesis is epitomized in his familiar dictum in
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), stating that "the most funda-
mental principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional
questions but to avoid them .... " Id. at 320. This would appear to be a
denial both of jurisdiction and justiciability. Indeed, the second question
cannot even be reached if the first is negatived. However, Frankfurter
was content to apply his thesis to the question of justiciability. On juris-
diction, see his opinion and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge
in Colegrove v. Green, supra note 15, at 552, 566.
17 369 U.S. at 208.
18 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
2°United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
21 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1961).
'Id. at 347; cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 229 (1962).
"372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote-
whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupa-
tion, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be
in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept of "we
the people" under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class
of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifica-
tions.24
The opinion went on to comment: "The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettys-
burg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments, can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.
25
Eleven months later, in February, 1964, the case of Wesberry
v. Sanders26 disposed of the remnants of the Georgia county unit
voting system. The majority opinion27 was read by Mr. Justice
Black, who with Douglas represented the surviving dissent from the
Frankfurter thesis in Colegrove. The opinion held that nothing in
the Constitution, and particularly in article I, section 4,28 "gives
support to a construction that would immunize state congressional
apportionment laws which debase a citizen's right to vote from the
power of the courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals
from legislative destruction . . . ."" The Court added:
To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another
would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of demo-
cratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House
of Representatives elected "by the People," a principle tenacious-
ly fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention. 0
In the sweeping set of opinions handed down on June 15, 1964,
the Court bound the series of reapportionment rulings into an inte-
grated restatement. In his introduction to Reynolds v. Sims,"' Mr.
2 1 Id. at 379-80.2 Id. at 381.
°376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Six members of the court concurred in the majority opinion. Mr.
Justice Clark dissented in part, and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented
entirely. On the rationale of dissent, see text accompanying notes 78-92
infra.
"' "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST.
art. I, §4.
29 376 U.S. at 6.told. at 8.
81377 U.S. 533 (1964).
[Vol. 43
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Chief Justice Warren sketched the progression from Baker.through
Gray to Wesberry, viz.-the question of whether a constitutibnally
protected right to an equally weighted vote has been impaired'. is
justiciable; where the issue is state impairment of the right in
statewide elections for state offices, the controlling constitutional
authority is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amejid-
ment; where it is state impairment of the right in voting for men-
bers of the Uiited States House of Representatives, the controlling
constitutional authority is the stipulation that these members "are
t6 be chosen 'by the People' . of the several States. In' eitier
instance, the principle to be enforced is the same-"one person.' one
vote" -and if constitutionally applicable to the lower hotise of'.'tlie
state legislature (Baker), to state officers and United 'States 'na-
tors in statewide elections (Gray), and to United States Repre-
sentatives (Wesberry), then it must logically extend to the upper
house of the state legislature since it turns upon the authority of
the federal constitution and not upon the theory of representation
set out in thestate constitutions"'
'The right of a citizeii to equal representation and to have his vte,'
-weighted equally with those of all other citizens in.,the election,:-,
of members of one house of a bicameral state legislature. would,
amount to little if States could -effectively submerge Itle equal-
population principle in the apportionment of seats in' the bther
house .. . Deadlock between the two bodies might' re'suilt in: ' :
compromise and 'concession on some issues. But in all too mihy
cases the more probable result would be frustration of-the majori-
ty will through minority veto in the house not apportioned on.
a population basis, stemming directly from the failure .to accord
adequate overall legislative fepresentation to all of the' State's
citizens on a nondiscriminatory basis. In summary, we can Pr-
ceive no constitutional difference, with respect to the geographi-
cal distribution of state legislative representation, betweenthe two._
houses of a bicameral legislature.8 4  ,
The opinion thereupon rejected the suggestion that it was,reider-
ing the concept of bicameralism anachronistic and neaningless~ad re-
asserted the ruling in Gray that the "federal analogy", Was
"Id. at 560, quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
For the theory of state constitutionalism, see text accompanying notes
139-69 and note 170 infra. '
3" 377 U.S.- at 576. ' .'"
15 Ibid.
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"inapposite,"3 and dismihsed the argument "grounded oi congres-
'siorial approval,; incident to admitting States into the Union, of
state apportionment plans containing deviations from the equal-
population principle.""7 In companion opinions, the Court, still
speaking through the Chief Justice, held invalid a redistricting proc-
ess which, however complex and sophisticated, contained "a built-in
bias against voters living in the State's more populous counties, "3'
or provided an improbableremedy in the form of a so-called "floter-
jal district."" Nor, declared the Court in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
.Gen. Assembly,4 can the fact that malapportionment plans have
been submitted to and ratified by the state electorate overcome the
constitutional objection to any scheme which distorts the weight
of individual votes."-
The sum of this litigation, concentrated in the twenty-six months
from Baker to Lucas, is conclusively that the exercise of the elec-
.toral function under the federal constitution must be as nearly equal
i the weight of individual votes as is practicable to establish. It
is equally evident that on March 26, 1962, the Court moved con-
sciously and deliberately into a new path-away from the rationale
which had culminated in the Frankfurter argument in Colegrove-
and with only one consistent dissent maintained by Mr. Justice
Harlan.42 The completeness of the shift can best be dscribed by
summarizing, the earlier jurisprudence and then by stating the pres-
ent- Harlan thesis.
The first concerted effort to devise a judicial role in the matter
of reapportionment developed in the 1931 term of the Supreme
Court, when several of the states were confronted, 'after the 1930
decennial census, with losses in the number of their Representatives
in Congress. The 1930 census thus confirmed the historic shift in
FeGray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963); cf. Maryland Comm. for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 675 (1964).
• 377 U.S. at 582; cf. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).39WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 654 (1964).
• -' Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). The term "floterial" is defined
by the Court as a legislative district that includes several separate districts
that independently would not be entitled to additional representation but
*whose conglomerate population entitles the area as a whole to another seat
in the legislature. Id. at 686 n.2. The etymology of the term is obscure, to
say the least.
" O377 U.S. 713 (1964).
"Id. at 736-37.
' The divergencies and consistencies of opinions in these cases may be
illustrated thus:
[VAf.43
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population trends which had crystallized in the years following the
first World War-a shift in favor of predominantly urban states
and in favor of urban areas within most states. The acceleration
of these trends under& the economic impacts of the decade of the
Great Depression and the decade of the second World War was
emphasized in the statistics of the 1940 and 1950 decennial cen-
suses,4 3 and it obviously accounts for part of the pressure develop-
ing in the litigation culminating in the present series of opinions.
Until the 1931 term, the Court had successfully avoided involve-
*ment in matters of apportionment or of calling in question the
adequacy (equality) of the exercise of the electoral franchise. Some-
times it denied jurisdiction," but more generally it simply held the
- . ,- to ..
Justice: tZ
Warren 1 1 1 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1*
.Black 1 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1
Frankfurter 4
Douglas 2 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Clark 2 2 3 2 4 2 2 2 4
Harlan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Brennan 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Whitaker t
Stewart 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4
White 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Goldberg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
*--delivered majority opinion
1-majority
2-concurring
3-partial dissent
4--dissent
t-not participating
"' "A nation once primarily rural in character becomes predominantly
urban. Representation schemes once fair and equitable became archaic and
outdated." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (Warren, C.J.).
The majority shift to urban population actually was recorded in the 1920
census, but the urban-rural gap did not significantly widen until the 1930
census and those following. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMEs TO 1957, at 14 (1960); Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reappor-
tionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962).
' See the majority opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577-81 (1900) (6-to-3 decision). This case is also
worth noting for the dissent of the first Mr. Justice Harlan, citing with
approval the comment quoted in text accompanying note 1 supra by Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
404 (1821), and disputing the majority finding of lack of jurisdiction be-
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
issue nonjusticiable because it was "political."4
Now, being asked to adjudicate a definite and substantial federal
question, the Court moved cautiously. In S-miley v. Holmi, 4 Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous Court, found that
Minnesota, having lost a Representative as a result of the 1930
census and not having provided for redistricting to take this into
account as prescribed by the Act of June 18, 1929,"7 was required
to elect its Representatives at large.4" The Court followed this
Smiley doctrine in other cases, involving New York4 9 and Mis-
souri8 0 arising in the same term. But the circumspect rationale by
which the Court disposed of these questions foundered on the Mis-
sissippi case presented to it in the next term; here the issue was not
failure to redistrict in conformity with the congressional enactment,
but failure to redistrict equitably in terms of population. The Court,
declared the Chief Justice in this instance, could not compel Mis-
cause of the "political" character of the question. Taylor v. Beckham,
supra at 592-93.
" Long haunting the Court is the ghost of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849), where the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney has been
understood (or rather, this writer contends, misunderstood) to hold any
cases arising under the guaranty clause to be "political" and hence beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court. See generally Bonfield, The Guarantee Glause
of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN.
L. REv. 513 (1962). See text accompanying notes 200-08 infra.
Relying on the Luther rule, Mr. Chief Justice White, for a unanimous
Court, dismissed an apportionment issue in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). Cf. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U.S. 219 (1917) (Pitney, J., for a 5-to-4 majority); State ex rel. Davis
v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913)(Day, J.). See also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608,
612 (1937) (Cardozo, J.); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park
Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930) (Hughes, C.J.).
"4285 U.S. 355 (1932).
' Ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5 U.S.C.).
Appellants contended, and the Court found, that the 1929 statute depended
for its effective interpretation upon portions of the Act of Aug. 8, 1911,
ch. 5, §4, 37 Stat. 14, which had not been repealed or superseded by the
later enactment. The 1929 law provided that apportionment should be pro-
vided for following the fifteenth decennial census and subsequent censuses,
according to the method of the last preceding apportionment-the method
of "major fractions," or of equal proportions. The 1911 law provided for
state legislative action to redistrict in cases where a state became entitled
to additional representation in Congress and for the use of existing districts
where the number was unchanged. The possibility of loss in representation
was not anticipated.
"285 U.S. at 374-75.
"Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375, 379 (1932).
"Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380, 381 (1932).
[Vol.43
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sissippi to redistrict equitably because Congress had failed to stipu-
late such a requirement in its legislation. 51
There the matter rested," until the cumulative social and edo-
nomic effects of depression and the second World War---combined
with the changing philosophy of the Court itself-brought the re-
apportionment issue back into the limelight. For, a dozen years
following the second World War, malapportionment cases were
carried to the high tribunal without a definitive response. The
Georgia county unit voting system was challenged in 1946 in cases
involving the application of the system to the election of members
of the United States House of Representatives53 and of the governor
of the state.54 In both instances the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal from the lower federal court, which had upheld the system,
suggesting but not stating in terms that it entertained doubts as to
its jurisdiction. 5 The same year an Illinois apportionment case,
appealed from the district court, was dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial federal question.5 In a 1948 Illinois case,5T a six-to-three
majority held per curiam: "It is allowable State policy to require
that candidates for state-wide office should have support not limited
to a concentrated locality .... To assume that political power is a
function exclusively of numbers is to disregard the practicalities
of government."5" In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas rejoined: "The
fact that the Constitution itself sanctions inequalities in some phases
of our political system does not justify us in allowing a state to
create additional ones."5
. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). Although Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes had no difficulty in Sniley in finding that the 1911 statute could
remedy an omission in the 1929 statute, he concluded in Wood that the 1911
law's requirement as to compactness, contiguity, and equality of popula-
tion could not similarly remedy the omission in 1929 because this "omission
was deliberate"--his reasoning being that the 1911 law had repeated a
stipulation of prior apportionment statutes. Id. at 7.
"See Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937). Note also the novel argument of the
Illinois appellants in Keogh v. Neely, 50 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1931).
" Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946), appeal dismissed,
329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam).
" Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam).
" Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam). Mr. Justice
Rutledge advocated a hearing on the merits, after which the question of
jurisdiction could be determined. Id. at 675-79 (separate opinion).
Colgrove v. Green, 328'U.S. 549 (1946).
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).55Id. at 283.
"9 Id. at 289-90. (Footnote omitted.)
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The bugaboo of "political" questions involved in cases of this
type has haunted the Court persistently. In 1950 a majority of
seven stated per curiam: "Federal courts consistently refuse to exer-
cise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from
a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its
political subdivisions."'0 To which Mr. Justice Douglas replied, in
a dissent supported by Mr. Justice Black, that "the only tenable
premise under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amend-
ments is that where nominations are made in primary elections, there
shall be no inequality in voting power by reason of race, creed,
color or other invidious discrimination."'" The next year the Court
sustained the lower federal court in refusing to intervene in a Penn-
sylvania apportionment issue where citizens of the state had "an
apparent, but untried, remedy"8 2 in the state courts and the state
legislature.' Exhaustion of local remedies was a well enough es-
tablished constitutional requirement; much less tenable was the
opinion, handed down in this same term, that the Georgia county
unit system when applied to a primary election did not present a
federal question because a primary is not -an election within the
meaning of constitutional jurisprudence.*
Still more tenuous was the reasoning in the 1956 case of Kidd
v. McCanless 5 where the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from
a ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court and accepted the state
court's tortuous explanation that it could not set aside, as inopera-
tive, the 1901 redistricting law because to do so would leave the
state without a prior law to fall back upon and hence without a
legal government or the means of electing one. "If ... this statute
has expired by the passage of the decade following its enactment,"
the Tennessee court had said, "then for the same reason all prior
apportionment acts have expired by a like lapse of time and are
nonexistent."6 The judiciary was very close to being impaled upon
the horns of a dilemma-with the prospect of permanent estoppel
°South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950).
oId. at 281.
Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1951), appeal dis-
inissed, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (mem.).
" Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952), dismissing appeal nen. from
102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
" Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952), dismissing appeal tnem. from 208
Ga. 498, 67 S.E.2d 579 (1951).
"352 U.S. 920 (1956).
"Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 281, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (1956).
[(Vol.4
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by the "political" concept on the one hand, and the prospect of per-
petual inaction by the states on the other hand.. It remained for
a federal district court judge, in a dissent from the majority opin-.
ion in Radford v. Gary,6 7 to summon a return to reality. To, the
majority holding that redistricting under the Oklahoma constitution
was a political question over which, a federal court could not assume.
jurisdiction, Judge Wallace replied:
With no threatened conflict between the Congress and the Fed-
eral Judiciary, the question simply is "Will the Federal Judiciary
stand idly by and permit the mastication of a federally guaranteed
constitutional right?" At such point the -question of "political
issue" or "delicacy of federal-state relationship" becomes second-
ary.68
The continuing efforts of the "unweighted" voters to make
representative government conform with mid-century economic and
social facts were not discouraged by the continued refusal of state
or federal courts to sustain their arguments. Between the mid-
1930's and the end of the 1950's, no less than fifty suits had been
carried to the highest state courts and more than adozen had been
litigated in various federal courts.69' The issues had occasionally
agitated Congress, although without any practical prospect of ace
tion. 6 But the judiciary-and particularly the Supreme Court-
could not go on indefinitely clinging to a policy of non-inrolvement.
On the one hand, the refusal to concede defeat on the part of those
who considered themselves deprived of their full electoril rights
kept a continual pressure on the Court to step into the vacuum
created by state and congressional inaction; on the other, the Court's
145 F. Supp. 541, 544 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991(1957).1d
. 
at 546.
', See the list of such cases in the appendix to Goldberg, The Statistics
of Malapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90, 102-04 (1962). See also Board of
Supervisors v. Pratt, 47 Ariz. 536, 57 P.2d 1220 (1936); Butler v. Demo-
crat State Comm., 204 Ark. 14, 160 S.W.2d 494 (1942); Shaw v. 'Adkins,
202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941) ; Attorney Gen. v. Secretary of Com-
merce, 306 Mass. 25, 27 N.E.2d 265 (1940); City of Lansing v. Ingham
County Clerk, 308 Mich. 560, 14 N.W.2d 426 (1944); State ex ret. Davis
v. Ramacciotti, 193 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1946); In the Matter of Fay, 291
N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943); State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmernan 264"
Wis. 644, 61 N.W.2d 300 (1953). - -
70 For discussion of early proposed amendments to the Constitution con-
cerning reapportionment, see AmEs, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS
HISTORY 42-54 (1897). For discussion of the debate in tihe 88th Congress,
2d session, see note 100 infra.
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own record showed a.definite, if ambivalent, acceptance of jurisdic-
tion and adjudication in the subject area. At least as far back as
1884; in Excparte Yarbrough," the Court-had disposed'of electoral
questions presented under the fifteenth amendment ;72 other cases in-
volving related questions had been heard under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.73
It became reasonably clear that the Court had crossed this Rubi-
con when at "the 1960 term it noted probable jurisdiction,74 and a
flurry of anticipatory actions began developing in various states.
When the direction of the judicial trend was confirmed on March
26, 1962, 75 the flurry grew to a storm; even before June 15, 1964,
almost sixty cases in at least thirty-eight states had been adjudi-
cated or wereawaiting -appeal. 8 Once the Court was launched on
its course, there was no prospect of a reversal, but all of the nine
reapportionment cases between these dates have been accompanied
by an. eloquent ,and elaborate dissent."7 Mr. Justice Harlan has
-'1iO U.S. 651 (1884).
"The indifferent treatment of the electoral franchise under the fifteenth
amendment is reflected in cases like James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903),
and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
" See 'Snhith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ; Grovey v. ToWnsend,
295, US. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Baker v. Carr, 364 U.S. 898 (1960) (memorandum decision).
- "See the comment of Mr. Justice Clark in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186,. 251 (1962) (concurring opinion).
.' See the list of cases in the appendix to McKay, Political Thickets and
Crazy Quilts. Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 Mxcu. L. REV.
645, 706-10 (1963). In addition to the cases listed therein, see Dorsey v.
Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Marshall v. Hare, 227 F.
Supp. 9.89 (E.D, Mich.), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 561 (1964); Swanson
v. Illinois, 226 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Bush v. Martin, 224 F.
Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd mern., 376 U.S. 222 (1964); Daniel v.
Davis, 220 F. Sgpp. 601 (E.D. La. 1963); Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp.
169 (D'. Del. 1963); People ex rel. Spence v. Carpentier, 30 Ill. 2d 43, 195
N.E,2d 690 (1964); People ex rel. Giannis v. Carpentier, 30 Ill. 2d'24, 195,
N.E.2d. 665 (1964) ; Le Doux v. Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 244
La. 981 156. So. 2d 48 (1963) ; In the Matter of Apportionment of Michigan
State Legislature, 372 Mich. 418, 126 N.W.2d 731 (1964); Robertson v.
Hatcher, 135 S.E2d 675 (W. Va. 1964).
S, "Mr. Justice Stewart has dissented in six of the nine apportionment
cases, and Mr. Justice Clark in two. See note 42 supra. The two justicesjoined in their dissent covering Lomenzo and Lucas, stating:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause demands but two basic attributes
o;f any plan of state legislative apportionment. First, it demands
that, in the light of the State's own characteristics and needs, the
plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands that the plan
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admonished the majority that- "those who have .the responsibility
for devising a system of representation [by his definition,th.e, state's
duly'- authorized agencies] may permissibly consider that factors
other than bare numbers should be taken into accounti ' 7 and he-has
demanded why a state may not deliberately choose to employ, popu-
lation imbalance as a justifiable and practical means of protecting
minority economic (i.e., agricultural) interests. 79 In Baker, the dis-
sent was paired with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's detailed historical
refutation of the proposition that strict equality of voting strength
had ever been a concept of Anglo-American government. 80 ', '
With the retirement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, -the Harlan
thesis became a minority of one, but its vigor was undiminished.
In Gray v. Sanders " the justice continued his .criticism 6f, "one
person, one vote" as a matter of arithmetic which he had maintained
in an appendix to his, Baker opinion 2 to be -irrational -in itself. In
Wesberry v. Sanderss 3 he warned that the majority opinion -"casts
grave doubt on the c'risiiutionality of the composition oi the House
of Replresentitives," 84 and he insisted that the only constitutionally
guaranteed right is the right to vote, not to have an equal weight
given to the vote. He reminded the majority of "the language of
the Constitution itself, in' article I, section 2, that the electors for
members of the House of Representatives "shalf have the Qualifica-
tidns requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branci of the
State Legislature," s8 with -its implication that only one branch would
be chosen on a population basis. The recordi of the'Constitutional
Convention of 1787 he found to "indicate as clearly as- may be that
the Convention inderstood the state legislatures to have plenary
power over the conduct of elections for Representatives -. ".86
The only federal agency permitted by the Constitution to lay down
guidelines in this area, the dissent continued, was Congress itself,
must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration'of the will
of the majority of the electorate of the State.
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964).
"8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 336.80 Id. at 266.
81372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963).
32 369 U.S. at 340.
"376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964).
"Ibid.
"Id. at 22.
°Id. at 33.
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whose, enactments over nearly a century, from 1842 to 1940, he
reviewed."'
The climax of the Harlan dissent appeared in Reynolds v.
Sims"8 and was appended by reference to the other cases decided
on the .same day. From the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment,, the dissent concluded:
(1)' that, Congress, with full awareness of and attention to
the possibility that the States would not afford full equality in
voting rights to all their citizens, nevertheless deliberately chose
not to interfere with the States' plenary power in this regard
when it proposed the Fourteenth Amendment;
(2) that Congress did not include in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restrictions on the States' power to control voting rights
because it believed that if such restrictions were included, the
Amendment would, not be adopted; and
(3) that at least a substantial .majority, if not all,, of the
States which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not consider
that in so doing, they were accepting limitations on their free-
dom, never before questioned, to regulate voting rights as they
chose.89
The dissent then reviewed discriminatory provisions in state con-
stitutions of the late nineteenth century which failed to evoke any
successful challenge under the fourteenth amendment, and pointed
out that the subsequent fifteenth and nineteenth amendments were
found necessary in order to overcome inequities which had been
considered beyond the scope of the fourteenth. Following this
exhaustive statement, the Harlan dissent takes the majority to task
for ruling out every reasonable alternative to the population basis
for reapportionment. 1 The dissent concludes:
These decisions also cut deeply into the fabric of our federal-
ism. What must follow from them may eventually appear to be
8
"Id. at 42-45.
" 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964).
"Id. at 607.
"Id. at 608-12.
"Id. at 621-24. The dissent- listed as alternatives'the following:
(1) history; (2) "economic or other sorts of group interests";(3) area; (4) geographical considerations; (5) a desire "to insure
effective representation for sparsely settled'areas"; (6) "availability
of access of citizens to their representatives"; (7) theories of bi-
cameralism (except those approved by the COurt) ; (8) occupation;(9) "an attempt to balance urban and rural power." (10) the pref-
erence of a majority of voters in the States.
Id. at 622-23. (Footnotes omitted.)
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the product of State Legislatures. Nevertheless,, no. thinking per-
son, can fail to recognize that -the aftermath of these cases,. how-
ever desirable it may be thought in. itself,- will have been achieved
at the cost of a radical alteration in the relationship between the
States and the Federal Government, more particularly the Fed-
eral Judiciary. Only one who has an overbearing impatience " -
with the federal system and'its political procdsses will believe that
that cost was not too high or .was inevitable.
Finally, these decisions give support to a current mistaken
view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this
Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in"
this country can find its cure in some conistitutiional: "principle,'
1
'and that this Court should "take the lead" in promoting reform
when other -branches of government fail to act. The. Constitution
is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should
this Court, ordained as a. judicial body, be thought of as a general
haven for reform movements. The Constitution is an instrument
of government, fundamental to which is the pimise that in a dif-
fusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that
this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court,
limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve
its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy jus-
tified impatience with the slow workings of the political process.
For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court
aofds something-to the Constitution. that. was deliberately excluded.
from it, the Court in reality §ubstitutes its view of what should.
be so for the amending processY2
The exhaustiveness of the Harlan exposition not only serves to
place in sharp. relief the countervailing. argument in the question of
apportionment, but confirms the fact that the majority opinions have
fundamentally affected -the. processes of representative governmg~nt
in the United States. -Indeed, a reading'of .the majority -opinions
underlines the. striking fact that no serious attempt has been made'
to reconcile the current jurisprudence of reapportionment with con-
stitutional or political history. There is, on the other hand, tacit
recognition of recent socioeconomic history. Indeed, the thrust of,
these cases is.an. accommodation of the fact of a-general urbaniza-
tiori of American life in the second and third quarters of this cen-
tury. 3 There is also an obvious andsharp reversal'.of the former
position of the Court which treated suth issues as "political" and
- Id. at 624-25.
, "Baker v. Carr is best treated as an episode in- the urbanization -of the
American community.... ." Schattschneider, supra note 43, at 7.'
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hence nonjusticiable, or as non-federal questions and hence outside
the Court's jurisdiction. But -the new jurisprudence has been sudden
and- exhaustive,, and its effect is to require the construction of an
entirely new rationale of American government and of constitu-
tional federalism.
The potential cataclysm in Baker was early recognized; to one
scholar94 it was second only to Marbury v. Madison" in its bearing
on national life, while another96 ranked it with Brown v. Board of
Educ9 7 as the two most important decisions of the twentieth cen-
tury. While Baker was criticized as a "political thicket" and a "crazy
quilt,"98 the subsequent cases have constructed a definite enough
standard to apply to reapportionment: equally weighted votes de-
termined primarily if not exclusively on a population basis, how-
ever distasteful' this standard may be for many. Much of the
discussion after Baker has been' rendered academic by the answers
which :the later cases gave to the questions raised in professional
literature.99 At the political level, the commentary has followed pre-
dictable lines, and has touched off a series of bills in Congress,
including proposed Constitutional amendments seeking to override
the Court -rationale.100
"Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27
LAW & CONTEMI. PROB. 329, 330 (1962)..
"'5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
"McKay, supra note 76, at 645.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"'McKay, supra note 76, at 645.
': See Bonfield, Baker v. Carr, 50 CALiF. L. REV. 245 (1962); Cormacki
Baker v., Carr and Minority Government in the United States, 3 WILLAAM
& MARY L. Riv. 282 (1962); Dixon, supra note 94; Hagan, The Bicameral
Principle in State Legislatures, 11 J. PuB. L. 310 (1962); Israel, On Chart-
ing a. Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker
v. Carr, 61 Mica. L. Rxv. 107 (1962); McKay, supra note 76; Neal, Baker
t. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREmE COURT REv. 252; Schatt-
schneider, supra note 43.
"'
0 The original opinion in Baker touched off a reaction in 1962 in the
form of three proposed "amendments to strengthen the position of the
states in the federal system." One called for a new Constitutional Convention
to alter the amending process itself; the second sought to remove reappor-
tionment questions from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; the third
proposed a fifty-member Court of the Union to review certain Supreme
Court opinions. See Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federalism: The
Confederating Proposals, 52 GEo. L.J. 1 (1963).
Following the June 15, 1964, opinions, Congress in September received
a proposed amendment. (S.J. Res. 204) which would override the apportion-
ment cases. 110 CONG. Rxc. 21372 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1964). When this
was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee with little prospect of
action, Senator Dirksen of Illinois and Senator Mansfield of Montana pro-
lvo 119
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* Assuming compliance on' the part of the states with the now
confirmed standard of apportionment of representation, the electoral
pattern in virtually every state of the Union is obviously due to
change.'' The results in terms of state and national. political posi-
tions are more speculative-whether the new .urban-suburban-rural
ratios in state legislatures, and perhaps in CongrEss, will mean 'a
renaissance of effective local legislatiofi and a corresponding decen-
tralization of government,"0 2 or whether the surburban interest -will
prove as inimical to the urban as to the rural,0 3 are consequences
yet to be assessed. But from the standpoint of constitutional Fed-
eralism in the United States,, the questions to be answered are more
immediate. If, as one student O'f the problems'contends, the changes
set in motion by Baker are really "politics in search of law,"'' the
judicial overriding-of so many engrained political concepts in Armer
ican fife can be termed nothing less than a revolution. At the very
least, the complete reorientation of the national cultural and political
outlook demanded by the jurisprudence from Brown through its
companion integration cases, and from Baker to Lucas, constitutes
an unprecedented revisionism.. One fact, at least, is beyond dispute
-whether revolution or revisionism, the integration, and reapporr
tionment cases have established a new frame of reference for Amer-
ican, constitutional law; the jurisprudence of the decade from 1954
to 1964 clearly marks a zone, of, discontinuity vis-4-vis the constitu-
tional developments from the Marshall Court, to the Hughes
Court. 0 ;
posed a "rider" to the 1964 Foreign Assistance Act which would have
relieved the states of compliance, with the Court's rulings until January
1966. 110 CONG. REc. 21372-77 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1964). Senators
Humphrey and McCarthy of Minnesota and Senator Javits of New York
then proposed an alternative' "rider" making it the sense of Congress that
the states should have reasonable time to comply. 110 CONG. Rlc. 21377(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1964). The two proposals eventually cancelled each
other out. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 633, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Oct. 7, 1964).
"'Knowles, Redistricting Will Have Wide Impact on Most States, N.Y.
Times, June 21, 1964, § 4 (Editorials), p. 3, cols. 2-7.
10" See Edwards, Theoretical and Comparative Aspects of Reapportion-
-n'ent and Redistricting, 15 VAND. L. Rgv. 1265 (1962).
10 Note, Small Town Representation: Invidious Discrimination? 43
B.U.L. REv. 523 (1963).1°& Neal, supra note 99.
105 Referring to a long line of judicial opinions which he held to' be
passed over without reference in the majority Sins opinion, Mr. Justice
Harlan observed in his dissent: "The failure of the Court to consider any
of these matters cannot be excused or explained by any concept of 'develop-
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
- The following parts of the present study will explore, first, the
case for the proposition that this new jurisprudence is in fact con-
stitutional revolution-i.e., that the judicial branch of the govern-
ment,- if -it has-not usurped the legislative function outright, has in
any event -overridden certain basic assumptions, extending back to
the'Founding Fathers, as to the exclusive area of legislative juris-
diction. Thereafter, the study will address itself to whether, if this
jurisprudence may be sanctioned as revisionism rather than indicted
as revolution, it is in fact jurisprudence in search of legitimacy.
II. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
The-most obvious feature of American government-and of the
eighteenth-century parliamentary government which provided the
colonial model-has been a- division of the several "estates" into
separate 'legislative divisions.Y0 6 "What touches all, should be by
all approved" is' ivirtually an axiom of Anglo-American political
science, although bicameralism has not-as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
so firmly insisted-been synonymous with universal equality of
representation. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that one func-
tion of bicameralism is to preserve certain specific class interests
not reconcilable with a "one person-one vote" democracy. Writing
in 1788 of the Senafe 'Proposed ii the new Constitution, James
Madison a'rgued:
If indeed it be right that among a people thoroughly incor-
porated into one nation; every district ought to have a proportion-
al share in"the gov.ernmeht; and that'among independent and
sovereign states bound together by a simple league, the parties
however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the corn-.
*mon councils, it does not appear to be without some reason, that
in a compound republic partaking both of the national and federal
character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of
-the principles -of proportional and equal representation.10T
ing'-constitutionalism. -It ,is meaningless'to speak of constitutional 'develop-
ment' when both the language and history 'of the controlling provisions
of the Constitution are-wholly ignored?" 377 U.S. at 591.
"'The "great and model Parliament" of Edward I in 1295 recognized
three estates-the lords spiritual (clergy) and temporal (barons) and the
commons. I ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 50 (5th
ed. 1922)'.
* zTHE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 416 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison).'
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Madison 'vrote at another point: -
It'must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there
is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniencies will be found
to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render-
the representative too little acquainted with all their local circum-
stances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too, much, you
render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to compre-
hend and pursue great and national objects.108
Madison saw the best course in a reasonably wide representation:
Extend the sphere, and you tike in a greater variety of parties
aind interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists,-it will be more diffi-
cult for all who feel it to-discover their own:strength, and to act
in unison with each other. 0 9
At still another point, Madison concluded:
The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as
a fundamental article of republican government. 'It was incum-
bent on the Convention therefore to define 'and establish this
right, in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional
regulation of "the Congress, would have -been improper' for the
reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative
discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same
reason; and for the additional reason, that it would have rendered
too dependent on the State Governments, that branch of the Foed-
eral Government, which ought to be. dependent on the people"
alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the differ-
ent States, to one uniform rule, would probably have been as
dissatisfactory to some of the -States, as it would have been diffi-
cult to the Convention. The 'provision made by the Convention
appears therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It,
must be satisfactory to every State; because it is conformable to
the standard already established, or which may be established by
the State itself. It will be safe to the United States; because,
being fixed by the-State Constitutions, it is not alterable by the
State Governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the
States will alter this part of their Constitutions, in such a manner
as to abridge the rights secured to them 'by the Foederal Constitu-
tion.10
1 Id. No. 10, at 63 (Madison).
Id. at 64.
""Old. No. 52, at 354 (Madison). .
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Madison's arguments reflected the basic assumption of the Con
vention. o 1787, which, in the initial "Virginia plan" for a new
frame -of- government, proposed that "the members of the first
branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the peo-
ple of the several States .... , This proposal was promptly chal-
lenged by Roger Sherman and Elbridge Gerry. "The people," aid
Sherman, should "have as little to do as may be about the Govern-
ment. They want information and are constantly liable to be 'mis-
led."" 2  George Mason, James -Wilson, and Madison -spok6
vigorously in support of election by the people; the future Supreme
Court Justice observed that "the. opposition of States to federal
measures had proceeded much more often from the Officers 6f the
States, than from the people at large.""" 3  The first vote oh the
subject carried in favor of the popular election, six to two with
two divided." 4
A full-dress debate was touched off on June 6 of the Conventiony
when Charles ,Pinckney moved, and John Rutledge seconded, a pro-
posal to have the House of Representatives elected by state legisla-
tures,?,The.motion-was defeated, eight'to threel"5 Two weeks later,
on June 21, another effort to-minimize the election by direct popular
vote was defeated." 6 'The only other, debate which indicated any-
thing of- the feeling of the Convention on the matter of suffrage
arose in Auguit."Gouverneur Morris, preferring to limit the vote to
freeholders and fearing that unpropertied masses would use their
franchise irresponsibly, sought to strike the proviso on elect6rs.
Benjamin Franklin held that ."the elected [did not have] any right
in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors," 17 and Mason
added his view that the Constitution should encourage the widest
possible franchise--"every man having . . . common interest with
the Society [i.e., government] ought to share in all its rights &
privileges.""' 8 The effort to eliminate the elector provision was de-
feated, seven to one, with one divided and one absent."0
11 FARRAND, RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20
(rev. ed. 1937).
1"2 Id. at 48.2 1 Id. at 49.
114
"Id. at 48-50.
115 Id. at 132-38.
11o Id. at 358-60.
2172 id. at 205.
1
' Id. at 203.119 Id. at 201-06.
[V 01.43
1964] REAPPORTIONMENT
From the record of the Constitutional. Convention two things
are ,clear: (1) the intention of the Founding Fathers was to base
the House of Representatives on a wide popular vote within each
state, and (2) the assumption was" that the most numerous branch
of the national legislature would rest on the same electoral basis
as its counterpart in the state legislatures: If there was. such a
thing as a rural bias in 1787, it was expressed in terms of free-
holders as contrasted with 'unpropertied persons. Any imbalance be-
tween rural and urban areas was not considered significant. 2 ' The
chief concern of the democratic forces in the Convention was to
place the electoral power in the hands of the people themselves,
rather than in their state legislatures. 2 '
The extended Convention debate on the Senate section only
serves to underline more vividly the Founders' concept of the func-
tion of the popular electoral franchise in the case of the lower house.
The proposal to elect the Senate by state legislattires carried, ten to
none, after a heated debate which emphasized that the Conventioui
understood the Senate function to be a process of deliberation with
"more coolness, with more system, & with morie wisdom, than the
popular branch' 2 and "because the sense of the States would be
better collected through their Governments'"'2 The object of the
second branch was to control the democratic branch, Randolph" in-
sisted, drawing examples from the Maryland legslature as char-
acteristic of state bicameralism. 24 In .a ,thoughtful speech fore-
shadowing, by more than a century, the basic argument for the.
seventeenth amendment, Wilson said:
[I] t was necessary to observe .the twofold relation in which the
people would stand. 1. as Citizens of the Gen'l Gov't. 2. as Citi-
zens of their particular State. The Genl. Govt. was meant for
them in the first capacity; the State Govts. in the second. Both
Govts. were derived from the people-both meant for the people
-both therefore ought to be regulated on the same principles.
The same train of ideas which belonged to the relation of the.
Citizens to their State Govts. were applicable to their relations
to the Genl. Govt. and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed,
'o See Dixon, supra note 94, at 385 (Chart I).
"2 The chief practical issue in the 1787 Convention, in the matter of
apportionment, concerned the counting of slaves-a group 'of persons with-
out any franchise at all.1 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 111, at 151 (quoting James Madison).
1 Id. at 150 (quoting John Dickenson). .
12'Id. at 218.
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-by abstracting as much as possible from the idea of State Govts.
With.respect to the province & objects of the Genl. Govt. they
should be considered as having no existence.... The Genl. Govt.
is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals for certain
political purposes-it is not meant for the States, but for the
individuals composing them:'the individuals therefore not the
States; ought to be represented in it .... 2 1
Throughout the debates of the Convention of 1787, the dele-
gates drew for their analogies from three primary sources: the
historical'experience of the unicameral Senate of classical Rome,
the bicameral example of the British Parliament, and the constitu-
tional machinery of the state governments set up after 1776. For
obvious reasons, the last of these proved the most fruitful source
of practical information. From the state governments as they ex-
isted at the time of the Convention, the delegates could discern six
(Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, and South Cirolina) which sought to elect their more pop-
ulous house by equally pportioned districts, while three states
(Massachusetts, New York, and South Carolina) undertook a com-
parable electoral plan for their upper houses. 1 20 It is hardly to be
doubted that the men at Philadelphia-whether conservatives like
Oliver Eilsworth, Gerry, Morris, and Sherman, 'or liberals like
Madison, Mason, and Wilson '(with Hamilton and Randolph vacil-
lating between the poles)---took for granted that the selection of
members' of- the lower house of Congress should be 'on a basis similar
to the election- to the lower houses of the state legislatures. Hence
the final language of article I, section 2 that electors for the House
of Representatives should have the same qualifications in each state
as the. elett6rs in that state for the more numerous branch of the
stat "TeUislaWre.
This being the manifest theory of thd' original Constitution, it
remains -to determine the modifications wrought by subsequent
amendrhents-=specifically, the fourteenth, whose legislative history
was so eloquently reviewed in the Harlan dissent.127 This question
is discussed in'part here and continued in the final portion of this
study, since it goes ultimately to the legitimacy pf. the new rationale
of represeritative government which the apportionment cases have
1 1 Id. at 405-06. (Emphasis added.) --
- 1 SeeDixoni, supra note 94, at 385 (Chart I); see also text accomiany-
ing notes 139-69 infra.
"2" See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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made.necessary. Were, where the i~sue is the revolutionary character
of these decisions,, one must inquire whether the fourteenth amend-
menti,.specifically or by subsequent- construction, affected the original
intent or provisions -of article I, section 2. It is self-evident, of
course, that section 2 of the amendment, requiring the .."counting
[of] .the whole number. of persons -in each State," modified the
effect. of the clause in article 1, section 2 -that had limited slave
population to three-fifths of its actual. numbers for apportionment
purposes, But it is pertinent to inquire whether, under standard
procedure in statutory construction, the tenor of section 2 may in
any way be related to section 1 of the amendment..
.Section .1 of the fourteenth amendment declares all native-born
or naturalized persons to be citizens of the Jnited States and of
the state wherein they reside--an extension of a rule, generally
recognized as applying to white persons, to the newly freed Ne-,
groes. 121. It then prohibits state infringement of the rights of United
States citizens, extends the specific due process provision: of the
fiftl amendment to the states, and inhibits, states from denying to
any person within its jurisdiction (i.e., including -non-residents) the
equal, protection of the laws. Taking the two sections together, a
case .may be made for the proposition, that the effect of the four-
teenth amendment is to enjoin the state governments from any action
affecting rights that are preserved under other parts of ,the; Consti-
tution to citizens of the United States. This proposition, of course
is the familiar ground. on which the Court has based an extension
of 6ther provisions of the Constitution to the statesi 29 relying sole-
ly: on ,section 1 in most instances as the basis of the extension. -
"Article I, §§ 2, 4, and 5, and Amendment XIV, §2, relate
only to congressional elections and obviously do not, govern appor-
tionment in state legislatures,"' conceded the Court in BalersO
"When challenges to state action.., have rested on claims of con-
_U' "While . . . the primary object of this amendment was to sectire to
the icolored race, then recently emancipated, the full enjoyment of their
freedom, . . . it is not restricted to that purpose. . , . '[but related also to]
discriminations in matters entirely outside of the political relations of the
parties -aggrieved." Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,..382 (1898).
... See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
Near v. Minnesota ex, rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See generally 'U.S.
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE ,UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
963-1176 (1953).
2ab 369 U.S. at 234.
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stitutional deprivation which are amenable to judicial correction, this
Court has acted upon its view of the merits of the claim.",'- Yet,
in Baker, the Court betrayed an uncertainty as to the logical conse-
quences of its majority conclusion in the disparity of the concurring
opinions which tipped the scales against the dissenting Frankfurter
and Harlan. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas sug-
gested one standard of adjudication: the totality of constitutional
experience up to the date when an issue comes before the Court,
coupled with the specific applicable statutes132-- e.g., the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.113  Speaking for a more cohesive majority in Gray,
Mr. Justice Douglas developed this argument further: state action
fundamentally influencing the effectiveness of an individual's vote
is within reach of the :equal protection clause; and equality of
voting rights "extended to all phases of state elections" 34 as -con-
firmed by the.fifteenth and seventeenth amendments. 85
Yet all this argument is, in view of the Harlan dissent, mere
begging of the question. That question is whether bicameralism,
by definition, is not based upon two different categories of repre-
sentation (only one category being equality of population in each
constituency) and whether the constitutional experience of the
American people has altered this definition. The majority of the
Court has focussed exclusively upon the equal protection clause in
answering the second part of the question affirmatively. It has de-
clined to review the proposition of reliance upon the guaranty clause
of article IV, section 4. It failed, in Wesberry, adequately to develop
the conclusions it reached on the 1787 Convention history of article
I, section 2."3' And it has dismissed the "federal analogy" of the
1
' Id. at 229. Compare Mr. Justice Clark's concurring opinion: "In view
of the detailed study that the Court has given this problem, it is unfortunatq
that a decision is not reached on the merits." Id. at 261.
""lId. at 241-44, 247, 249.
1328 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958).
... Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
' s Id. at 379-80. The Douglas opinion all but disposed of the renowned
"Bradley syllogism" in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which
the majority of the Court (the first Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting) speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Bradley held that the fourteenth amendment pro-
hibited only state action against individuals in denial of their constitutional
rights.
'".See Wesherry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), where from the record
of the 1787 Convention the Court concluded:
It is in the light of such. history that we must construe Article I,
§ 2, of the Constitution, which, carrying out the ideas of Madison
and those of like views, provides that Representatives shall be
[Vol. 43
REAPPORTIONMLNT
equal-state-representation in the Senate as "inapposite,"' 37 although
it could have strengthened its argument by pointing out that the
seventeenth amendment substantially modified the federal definition
of bicameralism.
The state definition of. bicameralism, on the other hand, has
been singularly affected by a wide variance between constitutional
generalities and legislative realities and by the disavowal of judicial
responsibility by the courts (until 1962).138 Consequently, one must
cut through the platitudes of state constitutions; which express an
almost universal concern for equality of electoral privileges, and
the legislative and judicial posture of state governments over the
years. The manifest established fact of bicameralism in state gov-
ernments, with the single exception of Nebraska, should be anno-
tated with a historical review of the changing forms of bicameral-
ism; this review, together with a comparative review of the
constitutional position vis-A-vis apportionment, should equip one to
answer the ultimate question raised by the apportionment cases:
if 'the matter turns on equal protection of the laws, then what laws?
The historical record of state legislative development may be
adequately summarized by a recapitulation of the experience of the
thirteen original states.
(1) Connecticut 139 did not replace its colonial charter of 1662
until 1818, and it retained in its constitution the "estate" concept
of the charter. The towns were the "estates" represented in the
lower house, .while the senate was a body of twelve elders'. All
members of the legislature were elected only by freeholders. The
senatorial membership was doubled by an amendment in 1828,'and
chosen "by the People of the several States ... according to their
respective Numbers." It is not surprising that our Court has held
that this Article gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional
right to vote and to have their votes counted.
Id. at 17.
1 372 U.S. at 378.
18 S e Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 92 Pac. 353 (1907); People
ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895); Prouty
v. Stover, 11 Kan. 235 (1873); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W.,
865 (1907) ; State ex rel. Major v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 364, 129 S.W. 894('1910) ; People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 921 (1802) ;
Harmison v. Ballot Comm'rs, 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S.E. 394 (1898);, State'
ex rel. Bowman v. Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932). -
...A collection of the organic laws comprising the Connecticut experi-
ence is found in .1 THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,,
COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE... UNITED STATES
OF AMERIcA 519-55 (1909) [hereinAfter cited as THORPE].
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the freehold electoral qualification was abolished in 1845. Other-
suffrage restrictions were abolished by subsequent amendments, so
that the 1955 constitutional revision now provides equal voting.
rights to all United States citizens over twenty-one years of age
who are residents in the state; the lower house consists of one
representative for towns of less than 5,000 population, two for
towns of more than that; the senate is drawn from districts' f:
contiguous and reasonably equal population areas.140
(2) Delaware,'4 1 incorporating into a state the three "lower'
counties" of New Castle, Kent and Sussex in its 1776 constitution,
created a lower house of seven members from each county and an
upper house of three from each county. The constitution of 1897
divided the lower house into thirty-five districts, the upper into
seventeen. Uniform male suffrage prevails in state elections.'42
(3) Georgia 43 in 1777 established a unicameral legislature
"composed of the representatives of the people."' 4 4 In 1789 a new.
constitution divided the legislature into two houses, the .upper con-
sisting of one senator from each county and the lower of representa-
tives apportioned among the counties. The 1945 constitution
provides that in the lower house the eight counties with the largest
population are to have three representatives each, the next thirty
counties two, and the remaining counties one. 4 '
(4) Maryland 4 6 in 1776 established detailed property qualifica-
tions for electors and elected and created an electoral college for
the fifteen members of the senate. The property qualifications were
abolished in 1810, and the popular election of senators established.
in 1837. The present (1867) constitution provides for one senator
from each county and six from Baltimore and a progressive table
of representatidn for specific counties and for Baltimore in the lower
house' 47
""'For the modeii constitution, see CoNN. CoNsT. art, III, §§ 3, 5.
" A collection of the organic laws comprising the Delaware experience
is found in 1 THoRPE 557-636.
"For the modem donstitution, see DEL. CoNST. art. II, § 2; art. V, § 2.
...A collection of the organic laws comprising the Georgia experience'
is found in 2 THoRi, 765-876.
.. GA. CoNsT. art. II (1777);145 For the modern constitution, see GA. CoNsT. art. III, § III.
""A collection of the organic laws comprising the Maryland experience
is found in 3 THORPE 1669-1826.
", For the modem constitution see MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 5.
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(5) Massachusetts,14 8 ultimately agreeing upon a constitution in
1780, established a, senate whose members were chosen from dis-
tricts determined "bythe proportion of the public taxes paid by the
said districts,"'9 and a lower house chosen by equal population
areas. Universal male suffrage was established in 1820, reappor-
tionment in the lower house in 1836 and in the senate in 1840. In
1930 a general reorganization of the legislature provided for equal-
population apportionment for both houses.' °
(6) New HampshireX5' in 1784 adopted a plan similar to that
of Massachusetts,, and in 1792 extended the equal-population stand-
ard to both houses. The apportionment formula, with certain
amendments in the nineteenth century, continues to the present. 152
(7) New Jersey15 in 1776 provided that one delegate from each
county should be elected to the legislative council (senate) -and
three from each county to the lower house. The formula for the
senate was retained in the constitution of 1844, which apportioned
the membership of the ,lower house on a population basis. This
revised procedure was continued by the constitution of- 194-7.1"
(8) New York's 55 constitution of: 1777 provided for an ap-
portioned lower house and senatorial districts of equal numbers of
freeholders. The property qualification was eliminated in 1845.
The 1895 constitution recapitulated the provisions of a number of
prior amendments to provide for election of .both houses on a popu-
lation basis. 1
56
(9) North Carolina ',7, in 1776 provided for a senate composed
of one member from each county and a "house of commons" with
two members from each county and one each from six incorporated
towns. The constitution of 1868 provided ,for senatorial districts
""A collection of the organic laws comprising the Massachusetts experi-
ence is found in 3 THoRPE 1827-1923.
"' MASS. CoxsT. pt. II, ch. I, § II, art. I (1780).
'0 For the modem constitution, see MAss. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, §§ iI,III.
"'A collection of the organic laws comprising the New Hampshire ex-
perience is fouid in 4 THoRPE 2433-2531.
" For the modem constitution, see N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 9, 26.18 A collection of the organic laws comprising the New Jersey experi-
ence is found in 5 TnoRE 2533-2614.
... For the 'modem constitution, see N.J. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ II, III.
.
18 A collection 'of. the organic laws comprising the New York experience
is found in 5 THORPE 2623-2741.
For the modem constitution, see N.Y. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 2-5.
' A collection of the organic laws comprising the North Carolina ex-
perience is found in 5 THoRPE 2743-2843.
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established on an equitable population basis and county representa-
tion in the lower house on a scale according to population. This
system was retained in the revised constitution of 1876.1 8
(10) Pennsylvania159 in 1776 established a unicameral legisla-
ture of freemen elected by "freemen of every city and county . . .
respectively."16 A bicameral government was set up in 1790 with
apportioned representation in each house. Reapportionment was
provided for in the lower house in 1857 and a more specific popula-
tion ratio in the constitution of 1874.161
(11) Rhode Island6 2 retained until 1843 its colonial charter of
1.663 with its highly limited one-house assembly of privileged
parties. Indeed, the birth pangs of the first constitution, continuing
well into the second quarter of the nineteenth century, precipitated
a renowned constitutional case'6 3 which has plagued the Courts into
fhe twentieth. 4 The 1842 constitution provided for apportioned
representation for all towns and cities in the lower house, and equal
representation for these "estates" in the senate. In 1928 the senate
apportionment was changed to a population basis. 5
(12) South Carolina 66 in the temporary government established
in 1776 created a unicameral legislature apportioned among estab-
lished parishes (counties) on a population basis. In establishing
its permanent form of government three years later, it created a
two-house legislature with representation in both houses on a popu-
lation basis. This system was retained in the Constitution of 1790,
but a century later the 1895 constitution, while retaining the system
for the lower house, reorganized the senate on a plan of county
representation.6
(13) Virginiae in 1776 provided for a house of delegates with
153 For the modern constitution, see N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3-6.
"'A collection of the organic laws comprising the Pennsylvania experi-
ence is found in 5 THoRPE 3035-3152.
Ao P . CONST. § 7 (1776).
11" For the modern constitution, see PA. CONST. art. II, §§ 16-18.2 A collection of the organic laws comprising the Rhode Island experi-
ence is found in 6 THORPE 3205-3240.
' Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
See text accompanying notes 200-08 infra.1o5 For the modern constitution, see R.I. CoNsT. arts. V, VI.
' "A collection of the organic laws comprising the South Carolina ex-
perience is found in 6 THoRP 3241-3354.
"" For the modern constitution, see S.C. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 3, 6.
"A collection of the organic laws comprising the Virginia experience
is found in 7 TnoRPE 3783-3962.
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two representatives from each county and additional representatives
from certain towns, while the senate was elected from specified
districts. The system has continued, with certain modifications, in
subsequent constitutions; decennial reapportionment was provided
for in the constitution of 1902.69
Thus the language of bicameralism in the constitutional history
of our oldest states indicates a variable concept of the function of
a two-house legislature. As is quite evident from the litigation
which has developed around the question of legislative apportion-
ment, the constitutional principle in practice has not met with gen-
eral acceptance, for the equally evident reason that it has not been
carried out literally in practice. Yet by far the majority of the
states protest in their constitutions that equality of population is
the primary basis for apportionment in both houses of their legisla-
tures, or at least in the more populous house.17
... For the modem constitution, see VA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 40-4-3.
170 See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENT, THE BooK OF THE STATES 1964-
1965, at 62-66 (1964); Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal
Constitution, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PAOB. 329, 387 (Chart III) (1962). The
states and their bases of representation may be classified thus:.
(1) Lower House of the Legislature
(a) The equal-population principle is found in 41 states: Ala., Alaska,
Ark. Cal., Colo., Del., Hawaii, Ill., Ind., Iowa., Kan., Ky., La., Me.;
Md., Mass.,, Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y.,
N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., RI., S.C., S.D., Tenn.,
Tex., Utah., Va., Wash., W. Va., Wis, Wyo.
(b) County representation, although with a provision for apportion-
ment within counties according to population, is found in 3 states:
Fla., Ga., N.M.
(c) County representation with apportionment based upon number of
votes in the next preceding gubernatorial election is provided by one
state: Ariz.
(d) Town and city representation is found in 2 states: Conn., Vt.
(e) Apportionment rests upon legislative enactments in 2 states: Idaho,
Miss.
(2) Upper House of the Legislature
(a) The equal-population principle is found in 34 states: Ala., Ark.,
Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Mass., Minn.,
Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.D.,
Tenn., Tex., Utah., Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo.
(b) County representation is found in 6 states: Ariz., Ga., Md., N.J.,
N.M., S.C.
(c) Area representation is found in 5 states: Alaska, Hawaii, Ill., La.,
Mich.
(d) Town and city representation is found in one State: R.I.
(e) Apportionment according to taxes paid in senatorial district is
found in one state: N.H.
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. The discrepancy between constitutional proposition .and legis-
lative performance--or between the constitutional definition of an
equal-population principle and an equal weight of individual votes
in legislative apportionment, as the case may be-is dramatically
emphasized by the fact that all of the eight states involved in the
apportionment cases before the Supreme Court have constitutions
protesting that equality of population is the primary basis for ap-
portionment. 71 Granting that such a categorization is largely sub-
jective, the point is, as the Court has emphasized in each decision,
that state constitutional protestations of equality either must fall
because they are not literally true, or must be lived up to if they
are. Thus, in Baker, the Court found that the state constitutional
provision for apportionment based on population could only be ef-
fectuated by legislative initiative, since popular initiative was not
an electoral process available to the state's voters. Denial of equal
protection by state action (or inaction) was thus discernible within
the context of the state's own constitutional rationale and on'the
face of the state legislature's record of frustrating the constitutional
protestation.'
In Sims and its companion cases, the Court continued to demon-
strate the .discr.epancies between the apparent disposition of the state
constitution and the actual situation vis-a.-vis. A'pj'6rtionment. Ala-
bama's constitutional provision for legislative apportionment based
on successive decennial 'census returns was found by the Court to
have been ignored for six successive census periods, with the result
that "population growth and shifts had converted the 1901 [appor-
tionment statute] ... into an invidiously discriminatory plan .... ,117
In the case of New York's constitutional provisions-repeatedly
described as having a historic concern for population accommoda-
tion-the Court found that the formulae for apportionment "are
so explicit and detailed, the New York Legislature has little dis-
cretion, in decennially enacting implementing statutory reapportion-
(f) Apportionment based on legislation is found in 2 states: Idaho,
Miss.
(3) Unicameral Legislature: Nebraska (based on population).
'"' See cases cited notes 2-9 supra. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964), the Court relied primarily upon article I, section 2 and only
secondarily upon the equal protection clause.
'7 369 U.S. at 189-90 n.4, 193-94 n.14, 237-41.
"" Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964).
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ment provisions .... ,174 Maryland's constitutional prescription, too,
the Court found so rigid that the best intentioned legislative effort
could not bring an equitable apportionment in terms of equally
weighted voting rights.'" Virginia's constitutional requirement was
condemned for failure to compel legislative redistricting on an equi-
table population basisY.1 7  And constitutional formulae which fix
apportionment on population bases which are themselves inequita-
ble, whether backed by long history like Delaware's1 7 7 or recently
ratified by popular vote like Colorado's, 7 8 must likewise fall before
the equal protection standard.
Alabama's constitution provides that "representation in the legis-
lature shall be based upon population,"' 79 that each county is en-
titled to at least one representative but the rest of the lower house
is to be apportioned equitably,8 0 and that the senatorial districts
are to be divided equitably on a population basis.1 8 1 In practice, the
Court found that members representing 25.1 per cent of the state's
population actually controlled the senate, and 25.7 per cent of the
people elected a majority of the house.'8 2 In New York, the per-
centage of population controlling the lower house was found to be
37.1, and controlling the senate, 40.9. s3 In Maryland, the upper
house was controlled by'14.1 pi- cent of the people, and the lower
house by slightly less than 25 per cent.'8 4 Virginia's senate was
under the control of 41.1 per cent drf ihe population, and the lower
house was under the control of ai slightly smaller percentage.8 5 In
Delaware, 2i per cent controlled the senate and 28 per cent the
house, notwithstanding a 1963 amendment by which the constitu-
tion purportedly was brought into line with the rationale of
Baker.' Finally, in the case of Colorado's 1962 amendment, the
... WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 646 (1964).
... Maryland Comm. for Fair RepresentatiohV v. Tawes, 377 'U.S. 656,
662-64 (1964).
1.8 Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 685-90 (1964).
... Roman v. Sincock, 377"tJ.S. 695, 705-08 (1964).
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly 377 U.S. 713, 734-37 (1964).17 ALA. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 284,
1 ""A.A. CONST. art. IX, § 199.
11 ALA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 200.
." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545-51 (1964).18 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 646-48 (1964).
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656,
664-66 (1964).
... Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1964).
." Roman v. Sincock, 377 ".S. 695, 705-08 (1964).
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lower house majority is now controlled by 45.1 per cent of the
population, while 33.2 per cent are in control of the senate. 7
- And so, to the question of whether the state constitutional defini-
tion of bicameralism rests upon variable concepts of, representation
(admittedly a moot point under the presently confirmed "one person-
one vote" rule), it ma'y be somewhat anticlimactic to answer with
a qualified negative. The fact is that the historical development
6i'state constitutionalism, as exemplified by the record of the orig-
inal thirteen states,' has look'ed generally toward a broadened base
of representation which has become embodied in the language of
most of'the current state constitutions.' 89 The further fact is 'that
the practice in-most states, as exemplified in the findings of the
Court in the six apportionment cases of June 15, 1964, has negated
the constitutional protestation of equality. Hence, the laws to which
the Court now applies the equal protection guarantee are both the
constitutional propositions ratified by the people of the United States
in the fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-third,
and twenty-fourth amendments and the constitutional convictions
of the'people of at least four-fifths of the states' 9 ° The Court
intends to give meaning to the state provisions despite contradictory
or inconsistent constitutional formulae or legislative circumvention.
Representative government, from the record of both federal and
state constitutional development, has assumed an ever broadening
definition with experience and changing times. Confirmed by the
constitutional record, the new rationale of the Supreme Court may
properly be absolved of the charge of revolution.
III. TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
In view of the cataclysmic effect of the apportionment decisions
-overturning virtually generations of political practices in order to
give full effec to federal and state constitutional generalities-the
"charge" of revisionism' 91 cannot be denied. It must be justified.
'181Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 726-29 (1964).
188 See text accompanying notes 139-69 supra.
18 See note 170 supra.
100 See note 170 supra.
181 Revisionism has various ideological definitions which should not be
read into the c~mmentary on the reapportionment cases. This writer, has
used it in its generally understood, though technical, sense, to relate .to
processes which seek to convert potential or actual revolutionary movements
into evolutionary ones. F6r the use of the term in socialist theory, see
Socialism, 14 Excyc. Sbc. Sci. 188, 203 '(1934).
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What Mr. Justice Douglas has said with reference to the totality
of constitutional jurisprudence to be applied as a standard of judg-
ment in the reapportionment issues' 92 may be taken as a proper
refutation of the Harlan dissent if it is taken in its fullest meaning.
Mr. Justice Harlan has protested that the legislative intent of the
fourteenth amendment was never construed to reach the states in
such a fundamental matter of internal organization. He has cited
the subsequent fifteenth and nineteenth amendments in particular
as demonstrating the proposition that constitutional alteration is the
only means of achieving a more -specific limitation -upon state-ac'
tion in this sphere.1"3 To which it may be replied that the rights
of United States citizens that the fourteenth amendment protects
from state infringement and the laws to which it guarantees equal
protection have grown and diversified in the century now being
rounded out since the amendment was adopted. The constitutional
postures of the thirty-seven states in 1868 have virtually all changed;
thirteen more states have been added to the. Union, and ten more
amendments to the Constitution. The nation has shifted its ,eco-
nomic poles from a rural to an urban-indeed, a metropolitan--
orientation.
It is inescapable that the Constitution applied to issues of the
mid-twentieth century is the Constitution of the, mid-twentieth cen-
tury. Five of the ten amendments adopted since the fourteenth
have concerned themselves with continually broadening needs of
representative government.'94 The very fact of state resistance to
apportionment requirements which would tend to accommodate these
needs is a recognition, however negative, of the proposition that
the people have a right to full and equal representation. 95 Repre-
sentative government itself must be defined in contemporary terms.
Where the action of the state tends to frustrate the clear objectives
of the people as these may reasonably be inferred from their con-
stitutional protestations, this action may be set aside under the
fourteenth amendment.
The history of the seventeenth amendment and the changing
.. See text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.1 See text accompanying notes 78-92 supra.
, See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV.
Following Baker, twenty-seven states reapportioned at least one house
of their legislatures. The date of last apportionment ranges from 1793 in
the case -of Vermont to 1964 in other instances.. See COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 170, at 62.
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concept- of representative, government -which it reflected emphasize
the validity of -the foregoing proposition. Despite James Wilson's
clear view of the people's rights in the matter in 1787,"06 the persua-
sion of the majority of the Convention was that government should
be a process of increasing removal, from the people with increasing
degrees of authority over government affairs.197 Alternatively, the
lingering analogy of the.Articles of Confederation, where the states
(rather than the-people of the states) had equal voices in national
affairs, had a manifest influence on some of the Founding Fathers.
The country's growth in population and in number of states, the
practical function of political parties,, the practical unimportance
of the electoral college, and the frequent corruption of the state
legislative function under article I,. section 3 together have over-
ridden,, qualified, or refined the original theory of representative gov-
ernment. An increasing and increasingly articulate electorate in the
America of the newborn twentieth century demanded that the peo-
ple of the states, not the state governments, elect the Senate."".,,
It is, in fact, the rights of the people of the United States and
of the individual states, and, not the governments of the states,
with which the fourteenth amendment and the applicable subsequpnt
amendments are concerned. These rights must be defined in :con-
temporary terms, for- they are the sum,'of the accepted principles
-and. practices of our development up to, the, present. With respect
to the basic questions 'of. apportionment, the 'sum of this develop,
ment points to the widest possible 'participation in government on
the most complete degree of* equality that is' possible. Republican
government today means representative government, and representa-
tion means universal'and equal representation. If this is revision-
ism, it is national history and not an arbitrary 'Court'which is the
reirisionist. '. . ,
"The enumeration in 'the Constitution, of ceitain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the pdo-
ple," states the ninth amendment; the rule of construction in con-
1. See 1 FAREAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
405-06 (rev. ed. 1937).
""Consider, for example, the constitutional provisions for state legisla-
tive choices for the Senate and an electoral college for the President as
contrasted with popular elections for the House.
i""See U.S. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
CONSTITUTION -OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTEr7
PRETATION 1207 (1953).
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ttct'l w- expressio unius est exclusio alterius- •shall not apply to
'American (constitutionalism where inchoate rights always wait 'upon
particular events to become functional. All political power is in the
people, uniformly aver the bills of rights of state constitutions from
the Revolution to the present.'99 And while these clauses, like the
ninth amendment, are essentially policy statements rather than self-
executing principles of substantive law, they are of fundamental
significance, both because they contribute to the standard of adjudi-
cation, where rights of the.people are involved and because they
gain in force as the definition 'of"people" broadens from freeholders
and men of property to all adult' citizens in the society.
The rights of the people of the United States, set out in the
Constitution as a. whole, include all guarantees contained in the
document. Thus we'come' to the guaranty clause of, article IV,
section 4. Here a 'number 'of difficulties present themselves, but
none so .vexatious as the 1 15-year-old dictum of Mr. Chief. Justice
Taney. in the case of Luther v. Borden0 0 which maintained that
the question of "a Republican Form of Government" was "political','
in nature and henqe subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress
and ihe Executive201 The Court in Baker readily accepted the
Taney dictum, 20 2 and it has clung to this position in the subsequent
apportionment cases-an utifortunate and needless weakening of its
rationale as a whole,. and, a failure' to recall the specific circum-
stances' involved in.the older case.
In Rhode Island in 1841-1842, a group of disfranchised 'resi-
dents met in convention, .adopted a 'new constitution, and attempted
by 'force to establisl 'a new government under it. 'The rebellion,
which bears the name of Thomas W. Dorr, the governor 'elected
under the new corisfitution, was suppressed. Ifn the process one
Martin Luther, a Dorr adherent, was arrested. Luther ihereupon
initiated an action in trespass against Luther Borden and others of
the arresting party, claiming Borden had no lawful authority to
come on the Luther property. The action, turned upon whether the
... See, e.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights of. 1776: "That all power is
vested in, and ,consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are
their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them." ,.7 THORPE
3813. Compare HAWAII CoNsT. art. I, § 1: "All political power of this
State -is inherent in the people; and the responsibility for the, exercise there:-
of rests with the people. All government is founded- on this authority."
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
201 Id. at 42.209 369 U.S. at 223, 292-97.
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government of the 1842 constitution was lawful or whether the
prior government continued in power until the constitution of 1843
was promulgated by the anti-Dorr forces. As Taney disposed of
it, the question was not whether either government was republican,
but which was legal. Taney held:
But the courts uniformly held that the inquiry proposed to be
made belonged to the political.power and not to the judicial;
that it rested with the political power to decide whether the
charter government had been displaced or not; and when that
decision was 'Made, the judicial department would be bound to
take notice of it as the paramount law of the State . . . that,
according to the laws and institutions of Rhode Island, no such
change had -been recognized by the political power; and that the
charter government was the lawful and established government
of the State during the period in contest, and that those who were
in arms against it were insurgents, and liable to punishment.20 3
* In so holdiig, Taney was relying 204 on the final provision of
the guaranty clause-the guaranty against "domestic Violence"-
and not the provision concerning "a Republican Form of Govern-
ment."20 5 Inapposite, to say the least, was his gratuitous comment
on republicanism:
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress
to decide what government is the established one in a State. For
as the United States guarantee to each State a republican gov-
ernment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is
established in the State before it can determine whether it is
republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of
a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority
of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its
republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional
authority. And its decision is binding on every other department
of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal .... 206
-0848 U.S. (7 How.) at 39.
... In regard to the threats of President John Tyler to intervene on the
side of the incumbent government, Taney cited as authority the Act of
February 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424 (now 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1958)),
which relates to domestic disturbances. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43.
305 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." U.S.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.0848 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
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Section 4 of article IV in the Constitution is part of a general
statement of state-federal relationships. Section 1, the full faith
and credit clause, specifically empowers Congress to implement it.
Section 2 is the privileges and immunities clause, and it-has been
enforced by judicial interpretation without challenge. Section. 3 spe-
cifically vests in Congress the authority to admit new states and
administer territories. Section 4, however, is a general federal
power, vesting no exclusive jurisdiction in Congress or the Execu-
tive, but by its terms being open to reasonable application by any
branch of the federal government. °7 It is, moreover, a right guar'-
anteed to the states. If state action frustrates the enjoyment of
the right of republican government, today understood to be fully
representative government, then the citizens of the state, as proper
parties at interest, should be permitted to allege that this action by
the state falls under the prohibition of the equal protection clause.'
Acceptance of such a position on the guaranty claus- revision-
ist in its own right, if you will-would round out the totality of
the new constitutionalism which the Court may properly bring to
bear upon the question of representative government. Taney, of
course, was a prophet of judicial restraint as Marshall was an advo-
cate of constitutional dynamism. The present Court in its juris-
prudence of reapportionment follows Marshall rather than Taney,
if a proper analogy between these early Courts may~thus be drawn'.
Marshall's fundamental position is illustrated in the opening cita-
tion in the present study; it is pertinent to conclude with another
of his remarks, even more familiar:
This... is... a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which govern-
ment should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have-
been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give
it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise
attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can 'best
be provided for as they occur.20 8
... See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A StudV
in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MXNN. L. R!v. 513 (1962).
... McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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